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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which authors were denied ownership of their
creative work after investing their time and energy, with the credit
instead being given to their editor or publisher. It would be
unconscionable. Similarly, imagine a world in which songwriters did
not own the songs they wrote, but instead the copyright went to the
sound mixer. The results seem unpalatable—because they go against
human intuition and are supposed to be legally prohibited through the
protection of copyright law. Nonetheless, a version of the previous
scenario is what happened to the film director in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
Merkin.1 After creating the film “Heads Up,” the Second Circuit
denied the film director any copyright interest or protection.2 This
comment analyzes the legal implications of the holding in the case 16
Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, which was one of first impression for the
Second Circuit.
Part II sets forth the history and expansion of the copyright statute.
Part III provides the facts from the case of 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
Merkin. Part IV addresses the standard of joint authorship. Part V then
examines why a director’s contribution to a film is a work of authorship
because it is a writing that is original to the author, that is fixed in a
tangible medium. Part VI suggests that the Second Circuit decision
was influenced by unfounded fears due to the work made for hire
doctrine. Finally, Part VII concludes with a plain reading of the
copyright statute and application to the case at hand.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND
ITS CONTINUED EXPANSION
Since copyright law began in America, it has sought to protect
creative works while also fostering creativity and progress. As the law
developed, it furthered these aims by being expansive and continuously
widening its breadth of coverage. The first copyright law enacted in
1790 was an exercise of Congress’s constitutional power, “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing the limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”3 The Copyright Act provides creators
protection by giving them certain exclusive rights such as the right;
1
2
3

16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8.
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(1) to reproduce, (2) to create derivative works, (3) to distribute copies
to the public by sale or other means, (4) to perform publicly, and (5) to
display publicly.4 Copyright protection has expanded to include
protection for new technologies, industries and business relationships
through new enactments and revisions by Congress5 along with
Supreme Court interpretations.6 As a result, the types of works that are
entitled to protection has grown and expanded.
A work must meet two fundamental criteria to benefit from the
statute’s protection; it must be an original work of authorship and be
fixed in a tangible medium.7 Beyond these two threshold requirements,
the Act maintains wide coverage by requiring only minimal levels of
creativity, or aesthetic merit, rather than applying a heightened
standard.8 Therefore, the prerequisites to receive protection do not
prevent room for broad coverage or the possibility to expand over time
as technology and creativity continue to grow.
The first requirement that a work must meet to be under the
purview of the copyright statute is that it is an original work of
authorship.9 The Act does not set forth a specific definition for an
original work of authorship and includes a non-exhaustive list that
courts interpret broadly.10 In fact, there has been a great expansion in
the definition of a work of authorship since the adoption of copyright
protection in America. At the time of adoption, the first copyright
statute only gave protection to, “map[s], chart[s,] . . . or books.”11 It
was not until later enactments that works such as music and drama
became included in the Act even though these forms of expression were
clearly present well before their authorship was recognized. Through
each enactment, the Act has become broader in coverage—from the
original list of protected works.12 The statute currently includes: (1)
4

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2015).
H.R. REP. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
6 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court
recognized that photographers receive copyright protection in their photographs.
Copyright was created as a matter of law in the photo because of the choices and
arrangement selections made, even though photographs were not listed in the statute.
Photographs were not listed because photography as an art was then unknown, due to the
fact that the science and chemistry behind it was not in existence. Then, in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), the Supreme Court gave copyright
protection to circus advertisements, stating that commercial use did not remove an
illustration from the fine arts category.
7 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
8 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
9 § 102.
10 Id.
11 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834).
12 Id.
5
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literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.13 The Act is even
broader than a facial reading may suggest since the Act’s use of the
word “include” makes clear that the listing is illustrative and not
limitative, meaning that although eight works are explicit in the statute,
other works not listed are also eligible as works of authorship.14 Since
its inception, the Act’s coverage has been continuously expanding the
meaning of what constitutes a work of authorship. In light of both
Congress’s and the courts’ interpretation of the Act, expansion of what
forms of expression receive protection should continue as new ways of
expression are constantly being created and have much faster
publication abilities.
The second requirement for a work to be copyrighted is that it
must be fixed in a tangible medium.15 This prerequisite is also
interpreted broadly; a work can be “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed.”16 This language suggests
that the requirement that a work is “fixed” is an opened-ended category,
which can be satisfied by many options including those that do not
currently exist.17 As the statute itself states; “Under the bill it makes
no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may
be . . . whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form;”
as long as it is fixed, it is eligible for statutory protection.18
After a work qualifies for protection under the Copyright Act,
there are still other factors that need to be examined for a creator to
understand her rights completely under the Act. Other factors include
how the work was created, who created it, and any contractual
obligations, all of which will affect the author’s rights. A work could
be a solo work, a joint work with another author, or an independent
work included in a collective work. The classification of the work
affects the rights and copyright claims a creator can make if there are
multiple authors.
13

§ 102.
Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2015). See H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 (explaining the broad application of this requirement).
14
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Sometimes even though a creative work is a work of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium, the copyright protection does not vest with
the author. Copyright might vest with someone other than the author
when a work was created according to the “work made for hire”
doctrine. The statute sets out two ways for a work to be considered a
work made for hire: (1) the work is prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment, or (2) a work is specially ordered or
commissioned.19 If an employee prepares a work within the scope of
employment, the copyright vests with the employer automatically;
however, if it is a commissioned work then there must be a written
document that expressly states the parties’ agreement that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire.20 Without such a written
agreement, the owner of the work commissioned does not receive the
copyright for the work created, but rather the author of the work
receives the copyright.21
All these considerations came into play when the Second Circuit
addressed a question of first impression in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v.
Merkin.22 The court in that instance asked, “[m]ay a contributor to a
creative work whose contributions are inseparable from, and integrated
into, the work maintain a copyright interest in his or her contributions
alone?”23 The statute has multiple elements that a court must examine
before deciding whether or not a creative work falls under the purview
of the copyright statute. However, this comment contends that if a
work meets all the required elements, and is neither a joint work nor a
work made for hire, a court should not deny protection because of
unfounded fears that copyright would become “Swiss cheese” with too
many potential interests, when the statute has a history of being
welcoming towards expansion.24
III. CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT:
16 CASA DUSE, LLC V. MERKIN
th
On June 29 , 2015, the Second Circuit was faced with the
challenge of deciding whether or not to expand protection of the
Copyright Act to a director’s contribution to a film. The only

19
20
21
22
23
24

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
Id.
Id.
16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 258.
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analogous case is Garcia v. Google, Inc., decided in the Ninth Circuit.25
In that case, the court addressed whether an actress has “an
independently copyrightable contribution” to a motion picture.26 In the
Ninth Circuit, the panel hearing the case answered in the affirmative
stating that the actress, Garcia, had established a copyright interest in
the film “Innocence of Muslims.”27 However, the decision was
reversed en banc.28
The Second Circuit case centered around Alex Merkin (“Merkin”)
a film director who relied on the Copyright Act to protect his creative
work of directing a motion picture. The creative aspects of his work
included, “advising and instructing the film’s cast and crew on matters
ranging from camera angles and lighting to wardrobe and makeup to
the actors’ dialogue and movement.”29 This creative work was fixed in
the film “Heads Up” produced by film production company 16 Casa
Duse, LLC (“Casa Duse”) who also looked to the Copyright Act to
protect their contribution in the film.30 However, the Second Circuit
held that only Casa Duse’s contribution to the film constituted a
copyrightable work.31 This decision ripped away any protection and
interest Merkin had and left him without any protection or claim to his
creative work.32 This result ignores the purpose of the Copyright Act
to encourage creation and is based on unfounded fears. The court
worried that giving directors, like Merkin, a copyright interest in their
contributions, in an already recognized work of authorship would
“make Swiss cheese of copyrights,” by having too many interests in
one work.33
Robert Krakovski (“Krakovski”) owns and operates Casa Duse
and in September 2010 he purchased the rights to the screenplay for
“Heads Up” and soon after asked Merkin to direct the film.34 Although
other members of the film signed work for hire agreements that stated
that Casa Duse would be the recipient of all the rights in the film
25 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Garcia v.
Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
26 Id. at 1262–63.
27 Id. at 1268–69.
28 An en banc panel of the 9th Circuit reversed its previous holding that a performance
that exhibited at least a “minimal degree of creativity” engaged in an original act of
authorship, for fear that such a holding would result in “[a] legal morass[,] . . . [making]
Swiss cheese of copyrights.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015).
29 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 259.
32 Id.
33 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742.
34 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251.
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including copyright, Merkin never signed such an agreement.35
Krakovski had sent Merkin numerous requests to sign a “Director
Employment Agreement” that required Merkin to sign away his rights
in the films, but Merkin ultimately never signed one.36 Despite failing
to receive a proper work for hire agreement, Krakovski allowed Merkin
to perform his role as director.37 After Merkin had completed his work
on the film and contributed his creative work, both parties attempted to
negotiate an agreement.38 Throughout the process, Merkin maintained
that he was “not giving up any creative or artistic rights he had in the
project and all of [his] creative work . . . is still [his] work and not the
property of 16 Casa Duse, LLC.”39
Negotiations ultimately collapsed between the parties as Casa
Duse did not want “Heads Up” to be a joint venture, and Merkin did
not want to give up any of his rights.40 In January 2012, without Casa
Duse’s permission, Merkin asserted himself as the sole author.41 He
registered a copyright in the film as a motion picture with the United
States Copyright Office and entitled the project “Raw Footage in the
film ‘Heads Up.’”42 Then in March 2012, as part of Krakovski’s plan
to publicize the film, he started submitting “Heads Up” to various film
festivals.43 He scheduled a screening for seventy people at the New
York Film Academy (NYFA) with a reception at a restaurant afterward,
which cost him $1,956.58.44 In response, Merkin threatened to send a
cease and desist order to the NYFA. The order led to the cancellation
of the screening, the loss of Casa Duse’s restaurant deposit, and failure
to secure any other film festival screenings.45
In the aftermath, Casa Duse filed suit against Merkin seeking a
temporary restraining order and injunction enjoining Merkin from
interfering with Casa Duse’s use of “Heads Up.”46 The district court
ultimately granted the restraining order and injunction.47
Subsequently, Casa Duse filed an amended complaint requesting a
judgment that declared that Casa Duse was not liable to Merkin for
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 252
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 252.
Id. at 252–53.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Casa Duse, 791 F.3d. at 253.
Id.
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copyright infringement, Merkin did not own copyright interest in the
film, and also requested that Merkin withdraw his copyright
registration.48 In response, Merkin filed an Amended Answer that
included counterclaims that requested a judgment declaring that a
motion picture director is an author, that the copyright statute has no
provision for a merged work, that there could be no work for hire
without an express writing, and finally that Merkin’s copyright
registration was valid.49 Ultimately the district court found that Merkin
could not copyright his creative contributions.50 This comment
contends that both decisions denied an author who created an original
work of authorship that was fixed in a tangible medium of express
copyright protection.
IV. SINCE NEITHER MERKIN NOR KRAKOVSKI INTENDED
THEIR WORKS TO MERGE INTO ONE THEY ARE NOT JOINT
AUTHORS
Not all creative works are going to have one author. Often, people
will work collaboratively to create a new piece of work. Examples
include co-authored novels and famous songwriting teams such as
Robert Lopez and Kristen Anderson-Lopez, who wrote the awardwinning song “Let It Go” for the film Frozen.51 The Copyright Act has
provided for this occurrence with its inclusion of the joint work
provision. Under the Act, a joint work is defined as “a work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”52
The joint authorship provision gives each author an equal and
undivided interest in the whole work.53 Each joint author then receives
the right to use or to license the work as they desire but he or she must
provide the other joint author with any profits made from the use of
that work.54
However, not all works that have multiple authors are recognized
as works of joint authorship. To determine whether or not a work
qualifies as a joint work, the Second Circuit uses a standard developed
in Childress v. Taylor.55 In that case, an actress claimed that her
48

Id.
Id.
50 Id. at 255.
51 Robert
Lopez Biography, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0520188/
?ref_=nm_ov_bio_lk1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
52 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
53 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998).
54 Id.
55 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
49
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contributions that were limited to providing research material to a play
entitled her to joint authorship and shared rights to the play.56 The
elements of the test are that: (1) the contribution of each joint author
must be copyrightable and (2) that the parties must have intended to be
joint authors.57 These requirements help protect authors from being
denied exclusive authorship status because another person provided
some form of assistance and minimal contribution that did not have any
substantive bearing on the work.58 It also provides safeguards to ensure
that when equal rights are at stake, they are only reserved for
relationships in which the participants fully intend to share those rights
and do not end up forcing two unwilling partners to share ownership
and rights on one piece of property.59
Although the Childress test seems to be straightforward, a
problem arises when both authors have collaborated in some sense, but
dispute whether or not there was a mutual intent to create a joint work.60
However, based on the language of the statute which requires “with the
intention that their contributions be merged,”61 there must be some
level of intent so that mere collaboration alone is not enough.62 The
court in Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc. pointed out that requiring
collaboration alone would affect the quality of work created as “[t]hose
seeking copyrights would not seek further refinement that colleagues
may offer if they risked losing their sole authorship.”63 This risk would
mean that creators would not seek out criticism or help in making their
work better for fear of having to share ownership, which would be
harmful to the world of creation.64
In the creation of “Heads Up,” Krakovski and Merkin
automatically fail the second factor of the Childress test because
neither party had the intent to merge their contributions.65 Their lack
of intent is evident by the failed negotiations between the two parties
which stemmed from Krakovski’s efforts to get Merkin to sign a work
for hire agreement and Merkin’s refusal sign away his rights.66
Although Merkin’s contribution to the motion picture fails the
56

Id.
See Id. at 507; Thomson, 147 F.3d at 199; Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d
1061, 1068–69 (7th Cir. 1994).
58 See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200; Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.
59 Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.
60 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068.
61 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
62 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068.
63 Id. at 1069.
64 Id.
65 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015).
66 Id. at 252.
57
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Childress test and statutory requirement of intent, there are cases “in
which the parties share a pre-concerted intent that their works be
merged to form a unitary whole yet still do not contemplate that the
result of their labors will be a work of joint authorship.”67 That
describes the situation here, where both parties, Casa Duse, and
Merkin, were aware of the fact that the final product of their creative
efforts would be a single motion picture, yet did not intend for their
rights to become merged as joint authors.
In an extremely analogous case, the Second Circuit was asked to
determine whether a dramaturge’s68 contributions to a play, that were
more than de minimis, qualified the dramaturge as an author of the
copyrightable material.69 In Thomson v. Larson, the dramaturge
worked extensively on the script of the musical “Rent” with the original
and well-known author Jonathan Larson.70 The product of their work
together was a new version of the script that was “characterized by
experts as a radical transformation of the show.”71 The court rejected
the premise that Thomson, the dramaturge, was a joint author because
of lack of intent evidenced by Larson’s sole decision-making authority
and billing.72 However, Thomson then went on to claim that in regard
to copyrightable material, a co-created work should be separated into
its components and that she had a copyright claim in her component.73
The dramaturge’s claims raised the question of, “whether a person
who makes a non-de minimis copyrightable contribution but cannot
meet the mutual intent requirement of co-authorship, retains, in the
absence of a work-for-hire agreement or of any explicit contractual
assignment of the copyright, any rights and interests in his or her own
contribution.”74 The Second Circuit was able to avoid answering that
question on procedural grounds since Thomson did not raise the
exclusive right argument until her appeal, thus leaving the question
open until now.75
By denying Merkin a copyright interest in his creative
contribution to “Heads Up,” the Second Circuit finally answered this
question. However, this comment contends that the court erred in this
67

1-6 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[B] (2012).
Dramaturge, OXFORD ONLINE DICTIONARY, (Nov. 2015), http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com.
69 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
70 Id. at 197.
71 Id. at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id. at 205.
73 Id. at 206.
74 Id.
75 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 206.
68
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decision. Even though Merkin and Casa Duse do not meet the precise
intent elements of a joint work, Merkin should not be denied his
copyright rights since “nothing in the Copyright Act suggests that a
copyright interest in a creative contribution to a work simply disappears
because the contributor doesn’t qualify as a joint author of the entire
work.”76
The Second Circuit relied on only two lines of reasoning to make
its decision. Its first reason focuses on the word “inseparable” in the
definition of joint work in the Act. The court stated that the use of the
word “inseparable” in the definition suggests that since the
contributions themselves cannot be separated, they are not considered
works of authorship.77 The basis for this argument comes from another
term defined in the Act, which is a “collective work.” A “collective
work” is one in which a number of contributions, constituting separate
and independent works in themselves are assembled into a collective
whole.78 The court reasoned that since a “collective work” requires
each contribution to be separate and independent “in order to obtain
their own copyright protection also indicates that inseparable
contributions integrated into a single work cannot separately obtain
such protection.”79 In order to support this conclusion, the court relied
on a House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, which stated that motion
pictures are usually a joint work.80 However, the court did not mention
that the same report also said that the question of copyrights in
contributions in films does not typically arise because of the Work
Made For Hire Doctrine.81
The reasoning of the court is flawed because it ignores the Work
Made For Hire Doctrine, and also assumes that inseparable
contributions are not independently copyrightable based on their
entwined nature. Even though at the time the House Report was written
it stated that separate copyrights do not exist in a film unless the motion
picture incorporates separate, freestanding pieces that independently
constitute “works of authorship,” significant time has passed since
1976.82 Since then, copyright protection has expanded in a variety of
areas due to the expansion of creativity and technology. Such
76 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Garcia v.
Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
77 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257 (2d Cir. 2015).
78 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
79 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 257.
80 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736
(emphasis added).
81 Id.
82 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5737.
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protection is bound to keep expanding further with the never-ending
growth of today’s technology and the use of the internet.83 The law
should continue to keep up with society’s culture and technology.
Expansion in protection is in line with the history and tradition of the
Act. Additionally, if a work qualifies as a work of authorship, there
should be no restriction on its protection just because it is intertwined
with another work of authorship.
V. A DIRECTOR’S CONTRIBUTION TO A FILM IS A WORK OF
AUTHORSHIP
Since the purpose of copyright, as stated in the Constitution, is to
promote the progress of the useful arts,84 the Supreme Court has set a
very low bar of creativity and originality for a work to receive
protection and thus promote the arts.85 The Copyright Act itself does
not include a definition of a work of authorship; however, the Supreme
Court has provided guidance by holding that “to qualify for copyright
protection, a work must be original to the author”86 and that “copyright
protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more
than a de minimis quantum of creativity.87 Even though there needs to
be more than a de minimis level of creativity, the Act does not require
novelty but only a “minimal creative spark.”88 Merkin’s contribution
to the film met the minimal requirement of creativity since it involved
innovative thought and influence.
A. By Giving Meaning to the Work as a Whole, Merkin’s More than
De Minimis Contribution to “Heads Up” is Copyrightable
In a Supreme Court case, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., a telephone service used a rival company’s telephone book without
permission to retrieve phone numbers to use in its telephone
directory.89 The telephone service was then sued for copyright
83 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005)
a new sub-species of copyright infringement was created in response to the expansion of
the internet that renders a defendant liable for copyright infringement if he has
“distribute[d] a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”
84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8.
85 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
86 Feist Publ’ns Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
87 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1067–72 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an actor’s suggestions to a script were de minimis and thus there was not joint
ownership).
88 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363.
89 Id. at 344.
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infringement by its competitor.90 The Supreme Court acknowledged
that even though originality is not a stringent requirement, the copying
of facts did not have “the modicum of creativity necessary to transform
mere selection into copyrightable expression”91 and that “copyright
rewards originality.”92 Even though the Court stated that only an iota
of originality is required to be covered by the Copyright Act, the
copying of facts does not even meet that extremely low bar.93
Since “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; [and]
even a slight amount will suffice,” a director’s contribution to a film
passes the extremely low bar of creativity required to be covered by the
statute.94 Merkin’s contribution as an director included advising and
instructing the film’s cast and crew on the following decisions: what
camera angles to use; what lighting best fit the scene; and what the
character should be wearing, doing and saying.95 It is the job of the
director to “interpret the script, coach the performers . . . [and] to
attend . . . to endless minor nuances and gestures.”96 Each one of these
elements requires thought and ingenuity on the part of the director. A
director creates a particular style and visual for a film that is different
from any other motion picture and even different from that another
director might have created. It is the director’s job to innovate and
translate the written word or script into specific scenes with particular
looks, themes and images thereby creating the point of view of the
film.97 Based on the fact that a compilation of factual material can gain
copyright protection if the complier’s arrangement is unique, a
director’s particular take on a script that results in a one of a kind film
should also gain copyright protection.98
Both the Second and Ninth Circuit have a history of protecting the
story-telling tools used in dramatic works. As early as 1936, the
Second Circuit acknowledged the significance of movements in a
dramatic work.99 In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., the
Second Circuit held that “a nod, a movement of the hand, or a pause
become bound together in an inseparable unity that depicts the dramatic
90

Id. at 340.
Id. at 362.
92 Id. at 364.
93 Id.
94 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
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meaning and any use of which without permission is copyright
infringement.”100 Sheldon involved a copyright infringement claim
stemming from a movie that was based on a true story from Scotland
involving a controversial murder by a young woman.101 The same story
had previously been made into a play by the plaintiff who filed suit
stating that the movie infringed on his copyright.102 In defense to the
claim, the movie studio said that it only took the play’s unprotected
elements because the story itself was one of fact and that dialogue came
from the play.103 However, the court noted that the scenes in the movie
mimicked scenes and sequences from the play almost exactly.104 The
court said “[s]peech is only a small part of a dramatist’s means of
expression” and that “a play may lapse into pantomime at its most
poignant and significant moments . . . [that] tell the audience more than
words could tell.”105 If copyright protects the medium of expression
that an author may use to give his work dramatic meaning, which is
what a director’s contribution to film does, then his contribution must
also be copyrightable. A director’s work on a movie involves creating
the movement of a film through his direction of the actors as well as
other decisions that gives the film dramatic significance and the scenes
meaning, which the Second Circuit has already said is protected
material.106
The Ninth Circuit made reached a similar decision. The court
stated that even though “[m]ere motions, voice, and postures of actors
and mere stage business are not subject of copyright protection . . . the
means of expressing an idea is [protected].”107 In Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., the Harold Lloyd Corporation sued
Universal Pictures for copyright infringement of its movie “Movie
Crazy” because fifty-seven scenes including the ‘Magician’s Coat
Sequence’ were reproduced in Universal’s movie “So’s Your
Uncle.”108 Universal’s defense was that the sequence depicted only
comic gags and stage business, which is not copyrightable because it
does not tell a story.109 Using the same reasoning found in the Second
Circuit’s decision in Sheldon, the Ninth Circuit held that such elements,
100
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when combined to create an original combination that is important to
establish the storyline with dialogue and action, become
copyrightable.110 Additionally, the court stated that “[t]he means of
expressing an idea is subject to copyright protection, and where one
uses his own method or way of expressing his idea, such adornment
constitutes a protectable work.”111
In adopting this line of reasoning used by both the Ninth and
Second Circuit, it is unmistakable the Merkin’s contribution to the film
is copyrightable. The dramatic composition of a movie stems from the
director’s command of the scene. The director controls every decision
from what the actors wear, to where they stand, how they move, and
what they say. Those decisions coupled with camera angles, lighting,
and other significant aspects of the director’s authority affect the story
and meaning of each scene and are the driving force behind the creation
of the storyline of the movie overall.
B. A Director’s Contribution to a Motion Picture is Original to the
Director
Through a series of Supreme Court cases, the word “writings” has
been established to have a broad meaning.112 The Court began to
interpret this word broadly in the late nineteenth century when two
significant copyright cases came before the Supreme Court. They were
the Trade-Mark Cases,113 and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony.114 In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court had to review
the constitutionality of the Trademark Act. Then in Burrow-Giles, the
Court had to address a copyright infringement claim regarding a photo
of Oscar Wilde in which the defendant argued that Congress’s
constitutional right to confer rights of authorship did not extend to the
creator of a photograph. With these questions in mind, the Court had
to define the crucial terms of “authors” and “writings” and in both
instances, the Court focused on the importance of originality.115
When Congress tried to regulate trademark rights through the
Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, the Court had to
address whether or not a trademark fell within that power.116 Since the
110
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Copyright Clause only protects the writings of authors, the Court had
to determine what should be considered a writing of an author.117 The
Court held that even though “the word ‘writings’ may be liberally
construed,” it only does so if they are original and “founded in the
creative powers of the mind” in other words “the writings which
are . . . protected are the fruits of intellectual labor.”118
The originality requirements founded in these two cases remain
the criteria of copyrightable material today and the very premise of
copyright law protection.119 In light of this broad interpretation of the
word “writings,” Merkin’s work on the film “Heads Up” fits into the
expansive interpretation of the word “writings.”120 By requiring
merely a “physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or
aesthetic labor,” a director’s creative input in a film is considered a
writing. It is the product of the director’s own thoughts and
interpretations that then get embodied physically in the movie.121
Nimmer goes on to suggest that the scope of what is considered a
writing encompasses non-verbal expressions which includes other nonverbal works than just the photograph held copyrightable in BurrowGiles.122
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Supreme Court
held that an illustration on a circus poster was copyrightable which lead
to the conclusion that the poster was a writing under the statute.123 The
combination of the court’s decisions in both Bleistein and BurrowGiles establishes that graphic, nonverbal representations may constitute
a writing in the constitutional sense.124 When looking at the definition
of the term graphic, which means relating to visual art, it becomes clear
that Supreme Court precedent suggests that a director’s creation
involved in a motion picture falls within the scope of a writing because
it is a graphic, nonverbal representation of a creative work.125
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Later, Burrow-Giles reaffirmed that the words “writings” and
“authors” require a broad and encompassing reading.126 In regard to
authors, the Court went on to specify that an author is the one involved
in “originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind,
[of] the thing which is to be protected.”127 As for writings, the Court
detailed that Congress had included any “[means] by which the idea of
the mind of the author are given visible expression.”128 The Court
reasoned that the lack of photographs being on the protected list
enacted in 1802 was because photographs probably did not exist at that
time, but that the Act is broad enough to cover them as long they are
“representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”129
In order for a work to be covered by the Act, it must contain the
elements of “originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and
conception on the part of the author.”130 Concerning the Oscar Wilde
photo, since it was made entirely from the photographer’s mind by his
actions of “posing . . . Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in
said photograph” therefore “it was an original work of art, the product
of . . . intellectual invention” original to the author.131
It may seem simple enough to apply the originator standard to a
filmmaker’s contribution, but motion pictures create a unique problem
when trying to determine to “whom [it] owes its origin” since by
definition, motion pictures are works expected to contain contributions
from multiple individuals.132 Further complicating the problem is that
these contributions merge to create one unitary whole, making it hard
to determine who is the originator.133
A similar problem arose in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, when
Aalmuhammed worked as a consultant for Spike Lee’s film “Malcolm
X.”134 As a consultant, he reviewed the script, suggested revisions and
rewrote scenes for accuracy.135 In the credits, Aalmuhammed was
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listed only as an Islamic Technical Consultant.136 After the film was
released, however, he brought an action stating that the movie was a
joint work and that he was a co-author and therefore a legal coowner.137 As discussed above, a joint work requires two or more
authors, and in this instance, the Ninth Circuit had to figure out how to
determine who is an author when, as in a movie, “the number of
contributors grows and the work itself becomes less the product of one
or two individuals who create it.”138 The court applying the TradeMark and Burrow-Giles standard pointed out that the requirement that
an author is “the originator or the person who causes something to
come into being,” is difficult in application.139 Although the
contributions need to be creative, this provides no assistance in
reducing the possible originators of a motion picture because it is
seldom that a contribution to a film is not creative.140 The court went
on to list some of the possibilities that exist when determining who the
author of a movie is, with one of those possibilities being the
director.141 The court stated that:
For a movie, [an author] might be the producer who raises
the money. Eisenstein thought the author of a movie was the
editor. The “auteur” theory suggests that it might be the
director, at least if the director is able to impose his artistic
judgments on the film. Traditionally, by analogy to books,
the author was regarded as the person who writes the
screenplay, but often a movie reflects the work of many
screenwriters. Grenier suggests that the person with creative
control tends to be the person in whose name the money is
raised, perhaps a star, perhaps the director, perhaps the
producer, with control gravitating to the star as the financial
investment in scenes already shot grows. Where the visual
aspect of the movie is especially important, the chief
cinematographer might be regarded as the author. And for,
say, a Disney animated movie like “The Jungle Book,” it
might perhaps be the animators and the composers of the
music.142
As in Casa Duse, the situation between Aalmuhammed and Lee
was further complicated because there was no contract between the
136
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parties. Therefore, the court had to examine the circumstances of the
film based on the standards laid out in Burrow-Giles. The court pointed
out that the author would be the one that would exercise control and
likely be the person “who has actually formed the picture by putting
the persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are to
be - the man who is the effective cause of that, or . . . gives effect to the
idea[s].”143 By using this reasoning, the court determined that
Aalmuhammed did not have any authority in the film and that the
oversight of its creation remained with Spike Lee, the director, and
Warner Brothers, the production company.144 Spike Lee was not bound
to accept any of the recommendations that Aalmuhammed made and,
therefore, it cannot be said that the film owed its origin to him.145
Unlike Aalmuhammed, whose only capacity in the making of the
movie “Malcolm X” was to make suggestions in order to make the
movie more accurate, Merkin’s role for “Heads Up” was more similar
to that of an author as defined in the Trade-mark Cases and BurrowGiles. As the director, Merkin is the originator of many aspects of the
movie, and it is impossible to know what the film would be without his
contributions. Whereas Aalmuhammed’s suggestions could be
disregarded by director Spike Lee as the director himself, Merkin did
not make suggestions, rather he made decisions that created the film.
Merkin controlled and made decisions about everything from camera
angles and lighting, to wardrobe and makeup, including the actors’
dialogue and movement.146 The way those elements appear in the
movies did not exist before him and were within his sole discretion and
authority. Using the same House Report relied on by the Second
Circuit to deny Merkin protection, the House stated that a director of a
football game was an author by using multiple cameras and deciding
which ones were sent out to the public.147 This shows that what a
director adds, even in an uncreative setting, such as a football game
where the outcome is left up to the players and not the director, is a
work of authorship. Therefore, it must lead to the same result where
the director is contributing even more in a creative setting, such as a
motion picture. In the Ninth Circuit’s list of possible motion picture
143
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authors, a director was mentioned as a possible author, if the director
can impose his artistic judgments on the film.148 Merkin was able to
impose his artistic judgments based on his assigned duties and the work
he put into the film.149 Importantly, the court did not consider Spike
Lee as an author because of the “work-for-hire” agreement that he
signed, assigning his right to Warner Brothers, an agreement that Casa
Duse was aware Merkin never signed when production began.150
C. A Director’s Contribution to a Film is Fixed in a Tangible
Medium of Expression
While some courts have offered a broad interpretation of the terms
“writings” and “authors,” courts have also broadly construed the
requirement that the work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
This broad reading comes straight from the plain language of the statute
that states that the medium “may be one ‘now known or later
developed.’”151 This prevents courts from picking and choosing which
mediums deserve copyright protection more than others.152 The statute
places great emphasis on fixation so that works that remain unrecorded
do not receive the same statutory protection as those works that become
permanent receive.153 Under the statute, a work is fixed if there is an
authorized embodiment that is permanent or stable.154
The
performance of a play, or other work, is not considered a writing
capable of copyright protection because it is not thoroughly embodied
permanently.155 If the performance is encased in “written” form, such
as a motion picture, however, then it becomes capable of copyright
protection.156
In Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., a 2008
case, the Second Circuit addressed whether copyrighted material,
which was only fixed for a brief period in between buffering before it
was automatically rewritten, constituted copyright infringement.157
The court pointed out that for a work to be fixed in a tangible medium,
it must meet two requirements: “the work must be embodied in a
medium . . . such that it can be perceived [and] reproduced . . . [and
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232.
Id.
Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
H.R. REP. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
§ 102.
Id.
1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08 (2015).
Id.
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).

2016]

Cheddar, Not Swiss

151

that it is perpetual].”158 Since the buffered information did not meet
the permanency requirement, it was not fixed.159
While applying the Second Circuit’s two “fixed” requirements to
Merkin’s contributions to “Heads Up,” it is clear that it was indeed
fixed in a tangible medium.160 Although at first, the director’s
contributions are merely thoughts in the director’s head, once those
ideas are acted out by the actors, and then filmed, they become fixed in
the finished project in the medium of motion picture; thus meeting the
first requirement. Each time the movie “Heads Up” is played, the
audience watches Merkin’s ideas, thoughts and overall concept of the
movie permanently displayed in the motion picture. Once a film is
recorded with the director’s instructions, the instructions are embodied
in a manner that is permanent; hence direction necessarily meets the
minimal amount of fixation requirement, which makes it fall under the
purview of the statute as fixed in a tangible medium.
VI. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF FRACTURED COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION IS UNFOUNDED BECAUSE OF THE WORK
MADE FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
The Ninth and Second Circuits have expressed concerns that
extending copyrights to parts of a collaborative work will open the
floodgates to copyright claims from any person who contributed to the
work. This concern, however, is diminished by the Work Made For
Hire Doctrine. Casa Duse permitted Merkin to proceed as a director
of the film without receiving a signed work for hire agreement from
him; however, Casa Duse tried to have him sign such an agreement,
which demonstrates that it understood there was a need for Merkin to
sign one. If Casa Duse succeeded in getting Merkin’s signature, or
rather hired another director willing to sign away his or her copyright
interest, Merkin would have no claim and this case would not exist.
The commonality between the cases analyzed has been the lack of
a work for hire agreement between the parties. The dramaturge in
Thomson did not have a contract with the playwright, the consultant in
Aalmuhammed did not have a contract with the director, nor did the
actress in Garcia have a contract with the director, and finally, Merkin
did not have an agreement with Casa Duse.161 The reason that all of
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these creative work relationships resulted in court cases is because they
lacked the security and clarity of a contract that laid out exactly what
each parties’ rights were in the creative work that resulted after their
collaborations.
Typically, under the Copyright Act, ownership belongs to the
author or creator of the work that turned the idea into a fixed tangible
expression.162 An exception to the rule is the Work Made For Hire
Doctrine as outlined above. Under this doctrine, the copyright does not
go to the creator, but rather the person who commissioned the work, if
there is an express written agreement between the artist and the
commissioner, or to the creator’s employer.163 The Work For Hire
Doctrine was examined by the Supreme Court in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, where a sculpture was created by an
artist who was hired by the organization.164 Freelance creators are the
biggest class affected by this doctrine, which would include the
directors, dramaturges, actresses and consultants of the cases discussed
thus far.165 If the parties involved had clear contracts laying out who
retained the rights and the specifically limited roles each party was to
play, the courts would not have been involved because there would not
be much to question.
In its reversal of Garcia, the Ninth Circuit stated that “Garcia’s
theory of copyright law [which gave actresses’ copyright interest in the
contribution to the film] would . . . splinter[] a movie into many
different ‘works,’ [which would] make[] Swiss cheese of
copyrights.”166 This quote was then applied by the Second Circuit in
its decision in Casa Duse. The Second Circuit based its agreement on
the fact that:
Filmmaking is a collaborative process typically involving
artistic contributions from large numbers of people . . . and
[if] copyright subsisted separately in each of their
contributions to the completed film, the copyright in the film
itself, which is recognized by statute as a work of authorship,
could be undermined by any number of individual claims.167
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Although this description is accurate, it neglects the fact that most
motion pictures are created with work for hire agreements for most of
the parties involved in their creation. The court listed producers,
directors, screenwriters, actors, designers, cinematographers, camera
operators, and a host of skilled technical contributors as those who
contribute to the film and would have a copyright claim if the court had
found for Merkin.168 Despite this type of slippery slope fear that both
the Ninth and Second Circuits expressed, the only cases that appear
before the courts are those that lack valid written agreements. In
Aalmuhammed, the court commented on the fact that Warner Brothers
required Spike Lee to sign a work for hire agreement so that even Lee
would not be a co-author and co-owner with Warner Brothers.169 This
example illustrates how producers can protect themselves—simply by
relying upon standard contract law.170
The dissenting opinion in Garcia’s reversal delineated the flaws
in the majority opinion in denying the actress her copyright, especially
in regard to its overlooking the importance of contracts in such areas.171
Judge Kozinski rightly stated that “[a]ctors usually sign away their
rights when contracting to do a movie, . . . [and] the absence of a
contract always complicates things.”172 Without such contracts, the
parties are left with whatever rights the copyright law gives them, and
the copyright doctrine should not be subverted by the failure of a
contractual arrangement. Without a contract setting forth contrary
terms, a director whose contribution to a motion picture, which
qualifies as a work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, acquires
a copyright in his interest.173
VII. CONCLUSION
The plain language of the Copyright Act states, “[c]opyright
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.”174 Since Merkin’s contribution to the film “Heads Up” was
an original work of authorship that was fixed in a tangible medium of
168
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expression, it follows that he should have had a copyright interest in
the film. The Second Circuit, however, denied him of such interest out
of public policy concerns for allowing creative team members, such as
actors and directors, a copyright interest in their portions of the film as
it would open the floodgates to litigation and shake the foundations of
copyright law. These concerns are baseless, as most actors, directors,
set designers, and costume designers sign work for hire agreements,
which would bar such claims. Casa Duse was aware that Merkin had
not signed any work agreement when it let him direct the film, an action
that should not have occurred if it meant to retain all rights. The failure
to do its due diligence should not diminish Merkin’s rights.

